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Congratulations, Ukraine is electoral democracy. Now what?
This month, Ukrainians went to the ballot box with 
heavy hearts. Most of them were making “a choice 
with no choice” among the 18 candidates running 
for president—most of whom have already been, or 
currently, are in power, from the Verkhovna Rada 
(VR) to local government. While nearly 85%1 of vot-
ers felt disenchanted with those in office and close 
to 60% had little faith that this election would bring 
positive change, a good two thirds, 67%, went to the 
polls.
The Orange Revolution showed Ukrainians that 
elections are virtually the only instrument they can 
use to influence politicians: however imperfect, 
they at least offer some hope of change. Still, voting 
is a far cry from a panacea: 47% of voters believe that 
their participation in this election will not affect the 
future of the country, and a similar percentage ex-
pects it to have no major impact on politicians.
The battle for the top seat in the land has been heat-
ed. Despite the considerable constraints on presi-
dential power, the main candidates still see the Pres-
idency as the ultimate objective. The President’s 
veto power and ability to seize the Constitutional 
Court afford him/her considerable influence over 
1 According to a Gallup poll in May 009.
 These and all further data regarding public opinion are 
from a survey run by the Democratic Initiatives Fund 
(DIF) in December 009.
the rest of government. The post also attracts politi-
cians because of the President’s power to nominate 
candidates for important positions, namely those of 
Governor of the National Bank and of Prosecutor 
General, and to appoint oblast governors and heads 
of county state administrations.
Mere weeks before the ballot, voters’ expectations 
regarding the honesty of the process were not heart-
ening: only 4.5% said they thought the election 
would be fair and free of violations. 41.4% saw po-
tentially result-altering violations as possible, while 
15.7% expected the vote to be rigged altogether. 
Meanwhile, politicians of all stripes fed voter dis-
trust via mutual accusations. Charges of ill-will and 
abuse of “administrative resources,” i.e. the inap-
propriate use of public institutions, abounded.
As it happened, the optimistic expectations of the 
international community proved accurate. The elec-
tion was fair and in line with both Ukrainian legis-
lation and international standards. According to 
the OSCE election observation mission, “…the first 
round… was of high quality and showed significant 
progress over previous elections … [it] met most 
OSCE and Council of Europe commitments.”
Foreign Players: Process über alles
In contrast to the 2004 Presidential race, when Ukraine’s Western and Eastern partners openly supported specific candi-
dates, this year foreign involvement was minimal, and some actors even drastically changed their positions.
Russia made it known that it would be happy with any of the candidates – except Viktor Yushchenko. Moscow chose 
new means of influencing Ukraine’s politics: continuing long-term integration projects (Crimea, a Customs Union) and 
ensuring conditions to protect its economic interests after the election.
The United States and the European Union emphasized the importance of a fair and transparent electoral process, while 
refraining from expressing opinions on the candidates. Still, these partners have no clear plan for how to work with 
Ukraine after the election. Much will depend on who wins and, further, whether either side will be able to overcome 
their stereotyped images.
One bit of good news for Ukrainians was the recognition of the process and results of the vote by official observers from 
both the OSCE and Western countries and the CIS as fair. This has been very much in Ukraine’s interest. With the world’s 
estimation official, none of the candidates or their supporters will have grounds to cast doubt on the results— or at least 
on those of the first round. 
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Exit Polls: Business as usual
This election confirmed the popularity of one civil 
society instrument used to check election results: 
the exit poll. Among the four national surveys, one 
was independently funded by donations collected 
from various sources, while the three others were 
Table 1. Exit poll results
National Inter, Socis ICTV, GfK Ukrayina, RBG CEC official results
Viktor Yanukovych 31.3% 36.6% 34.50% 34.7% 35.32%
Yulia Tymoshenko 27.1% 25.8% 25.63% 25.0% 25.05%
Serhiy Tihipko 13.4% 13.5% 13.79% 13.2% 13.05%
Arseniy Yatseniuk 7.8% 6.6% 7.01% 7.1% 6.96%
Viktor Yushchenko 6.0% 5.2% 5.65% 5.8% 5.45%
commissioned by major television channels. The 
results of all exit polls confirmed the expected two 
frontrunners, Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Ty-
moshenko.
Despite differences in methodology, the results 
were very similar. Only the National exit poll run 
jointly by the Democratic Initiatives Fund (DIF), the 
Razumkov Center and the Kyiv International Insti-
tute of Sociology showed a smaller gap between the 
two top candidates. The poll’s organizers attributed 
their survey’s imperfections to inadequate funding 
and a consequently smaller pool of polling stations 
covered.
The contradictory reactions of politicians to the re-
sults of the National exit poll and accusations of bias 
from some quarters appear to be attempts to dis-
credit this democratic instrument prior to the run-
off. The presence of “paid for” exit polls plays into 
the hands of these politicians. In addition to these 
accusations, lack of funding could definitely jeopar-
dize the running of this poll in February. Given the 
key role that the National exit poll played in 004, 
the need for this instrument is obvious. After all, the 
professionalism and high reputation of its organiz-
ers is a guarantee of the independence and quality 
of the survey.
How did Ukrainians vote?
Most Ukrainian politicians are convinced that, to 
win an election, all it takes is a good image and 
sweet promises. Despite their serious dissatisfaction 
with those in power, voters once again gave most 
of their votes to the current and previous premiers. 
Ukrainians appear to have voted more “with their 
hearts than with their heads.”
The relative irrelevance of candidates’ ideas and 
positions was a key characteristic of this campaign. 
Old chestnuts like NATO membership and the use 
of Russian as a second language disappeared from 
the campaign trail and foreign policy rhetoric was 
cautious. Each candidate tried to portray his or her-
self as the country’s only possible “savior.” People 
chose their “savior” based on their attitudes towards 
candidates’ personalities, specific aspects of their 
biographies, and their slogans.
The Results:  
As expected… with a few surprises
The official results of the January 17 vote allowed 
Viktor Yanukovych, with 35.3% of the vote, and Yu-
lia Tymoshenko, with 5.05%, to move on to the run-
off. The gap between the two was of 10.7%, which, 
although high, cannot be considered a clear victory 
for the frontrunner.
In contrast to 004, when there was strong polar-
ization among regions, only Viktor Yanukovych 
enjoyed unquestioning and unchanging regional 
support, receiving 50–70% of votes in Eastern and 
Southern Ukraine. He was also able to make inroads 
into his main rival’s territory and to come out on top 
in Zakarpattia. Compared to the 007 VR elections, 
Viktor Yanukovych was able to attract 600,000 more 
votes, while Yulia Tymoshenko lost nearly 1 million.
Serhiy Tihipko’s third-place finish had been pre-
dicted by quite a few analysts. During the fall 009, 
he was able to pick up disenchanted Arseniy Yatse-
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niuk voters and persuade many undecideds to go 
for him as well. But no one expected him to receive 
13.05% of the vote. This testifies to a strong desire 
among voters for “new faces,” and a positive reac-
tion to his campaign. Focusing not on mudslinging 
and fear-mongering, Mr. Tihipko’s campaign strat-
egy of talking systemic sectoral reforms worked. 
What his voters and Arseniy Yatseniuk’s electorate 
do in the run-off—together, they represent 0% of 
the vote—will be a deciding factor.
The incumbent President drew, 5.45% of the vote, in 
line with expectations. Still, his supporters are un-
likely to play a major role in the February run-off. 
Most will probably abstain or vote “Against both 
candidates.” Mr. Yushchenko’s support confirms 
the fact that ideologically – and even psychologi-
cally – these Ukrainians cannot accept either of the 
leading candidates.
The vote offered a few other interesting results as 
well:
Ukraine has learned to hold democratic elections. 
Politicians’ warnings of widespread vote-rigging 
proved unfounded and seemed to be simply a 
•
way to justify their own defeats. Even Viktor Ya-
nukovych, who was once seen as the main enemy 
of fair elections, now clearly favors them.
All candidates recognized the results, as illus-
trated by the absence of official complaints to the 
CEC or the courts. The CEC declared the vote 
void in only five polling stations, in four electoral 
districts.
The level of public support for the candidates in-
dicates the prospects for the parties and political 
projects they lead in the next local and legisla-
tive elections (010 and 01).
Concerns in the West about xenophobia in 
Ukraine stirred by statements from Uzhhorod 
mayor Serhiy Ratushniak, with his anti-Semitic 
rhetoric, and by L’viv’s radical nationalist Oleh 
Tiahnybok proved unfounded. Combined, they 
received little more than 1.5% of the vote—ap-
proximately 380,000 voters, or about a quarter of 
the population of Zakarpattia oblast, where Uzh-
horod is a center.
•
•
•
The Run-off: What’s next?
So, the first round of the Presidential election is over 
and the results are in. Now the country faces a three-
week blitz for the top post, a vote, and the calcula-
tion of its results. What could affect the results of 
the run-off? Which of the two candidates will man-
age to get the votes of the candidates who lost in the 
first round? What coalitions might be formed and 
what will they cost? What institutional and legisla-
tive pitfalls could affect the second round? What are 
the biggest risks in this run-off election?
Who gets the pumpkin?
Immediately after the announcement of the exit 
polls, it became clear that both Viktor Yanukovych 
and Yulia Tymoshenko would need more votes in the 
3 In Ukrainian tradition, young women who were being 
courted turned down unwanted suitors by handing 
them a pumpkin.
second round. Given that neither of them picked up 
just over 60 per cent of votes combined, the votes of 
the 10 million Ukrainians who cast their ballots for 
other candidates will figure strongly in this run-off. 
And more than six million of those 10 voted for Serhiy 
Tihipko, Arseniy Yatseniuk or Viktor Yushchenko.
The two remaining candidates now have to per-
suade voters who initially chose other candidates to 
change their positions. According to the exit polls, 
however, 30–50% stated that they intended to sup-
port “neither of the candidates” in the run-off. So a 
change of position will largely depend on whether 
their candidate in the first round throws his support 
behind one of the remaining two. Neither Mr. Yat-
seniuk nor Mr. Yushchenko will openly support Mr. 
Yanukovych or Ms. Tymoshenko. So far, Mr. Tihip-
ko has also kept his cards close to his chest, despite 
obvious offers from both camps.
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Yulia Tymoshenko was first to offer the post of Pre-
mier to Mr. Tihipko, who has been both Economy 
Minister and Deputy Premier. Should she win, she 
is definitely in a position to guarantee a favorable 
vote for his candidacy in the Verkhovna Rada, as 
he is likely to find support outside the coalition. Al-
though Mr. Tihipko has declined to endorse Ms. Ty-
moshenko and his talks with Viktor Yanukovych are 
still very secretive, he has already publicly stated 
that he would be happy to serve as Premier under 
either candidate, suggesting that he is not buying 
into either of them...yet. This leaves the field wide 
open for the run-off, as both candidates will need 
the support of his voters to win.
Most likely Mr. Tihipko will continue to avoid any 
official alliance with either of the candidates. He un-
derstands the limited impact that he will have over 
the choices of his electorate and knows that there 
are other elections coming up as well. Still, his of-
ficial stance of remaining neutral towards both can-
didates until the end of the election risks removing 
him from the field as a serious player and leaving 
him to compete with insignificant also-rans in the 
local and VR elections.
On the other hand, a coalition with Serhiy Tihipko 
would also bring certain risks for both candidates. 
For Viktor Yanukovych, it will be hard to forget Mr. 
Tihipko’s “betrayal” in 0044 and reconcile him with 
the Party of Regions’ (PoR) business backers, as well 
as with chief economist Mykola Azarov. An alliance 
between Mr. Tihipko and Yulia Tymoshenko would 
primarily be complicated by the fact that both are 
very strong personalities with their own ambitions 
and their own views for the country’s future. 
In either case, Serhiy Tihipko must understand the 
risky nature of the post of Head of Government in the 
current economic situation, when unpopular moves 
can no longer be postponed. At the same time, he 
will not consent to being a mere “executive” Pre-
mier, and will attempt to play his own game. This is 
precisely what threatens to reproduce the old duel 
between President and Premier and to block even 
simple attempts at reform.
4 Mr. Tihipko was in charge of Mr. Yanukovych’s elec-
toral campaign in 004, but quit after the Supreme 
Court overruled the results of the massively rigged 
second round.
An institutional minefield
In preparing for this election, politicians took into 
account the experience of 004 and acted to resolve 
the problems that had had such a serious impact on 
the results. On one hand, new mechanisms have 
reduced opportunities for vote-rigging during the 
actual vote. On the other hand, they have made life 
more difficult for voters and left room for mutual 
accusations. Those changes made the enormous in-
stitutional crisis in Ukraine’s public administration 
more obvious. After all, there is little reason to be-
lieve that polling stations will work any better than 
the country’s residential services administrators or 
the police.
Voter lists: Look for your name…again  
and again 
Although a consolidated State Voter Registry was 
set up and by fall 009 voters could check their in-
formation, errors and omissions on the lists were 
among the biggest problems on Election Day. Vot-
ers were forced to wait in long lines for administra-
tive courts to rule on corrections and insertions—in-
cluding people who had been properly registered in 
the previous list. At the moment, it is not clear what 
percentage of voters ran into such problems and 
how many cases were resolved.
The Central Electoral Commission announced its 
intention to fix all the problems that came up with 
the lists prior to the second round, but how realistic 
this statement is remains to be seen.
At-home voting: Homesick?
This option became the focus of most accusations of 
vote-rigging during the first round. At the last min-
ute, on 16 January, the Kyiv Administrative Court of 
Appeals passed a ruling changing the procedure for 
voting at home, according to which voters now had 
to provide a medical note confirming their inability 
to go out. This created a major conundrum, as appli-
cations to vote at home had to be submitted no later 
than January 15 - that is, prior to the ruling. Applica-
tions previously submitted without a medical note 
could not comply with the new requirements.
In fact, 1,004,18 voters applied for this privilege. 
This added up to less than 3% of all voters and some-
what more than 4% of those who actually voted on 
17 January. However, the Committee of Voters of 
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Ukraine (CVU) noted that in some rural areas, this 
figure was almost 30%. Unusually cold weather con-
ditions could explain this, given the high number of 
elderly voters in such districts. Still, this difference 
could possibly suggest a certain abuse of home vot-
ing privileges.
The effect of all this on the run-off could be mini-
mized if politicians, firstly, recognize the court’s de-
cision and, secondly, refrain from pressuring courts 
to establish new requirements for home voting.
The CEC: Empty-chair politics
According to preliminary assessments by interna-
tional observers, the CEC carried out its functions 
properly. It quickly published the preliminary re-
sults of the election based on electronic tabulations. 
On 5 January, the CEC announced the official final 
results and the date of the run-off election, Sunday, 
7 February 010. Moreover, it did so in less than the 
allotted time period.
Still, the CEC did not completely avoid political 
contretemps. Commissioner Anatoliy Pysarenko, 
who had reached the upper age limit for members of 
the Civil Service in March 009, continued to carry 
out his duties up until the election. All this time, 
neither the CEC nor any of the branches of govern-
ment, such as the Verkhovna Rada or the President, 
raised the question of replacing him.
Then, just before and during the first round of the 
election, this situation suddenly led to lawsuits. On 
19 January, two days after the vote, the Verkhovna 
Rada passed a Resolution dismissing Mr. Pysarenko 
without having a candidate to replace him, which 
was the President’s prerogative to propose. It was 
already 1 January when the Rada considered Mr. 
Yushchenko’s nominee, Valeriy Karpuntsov, whose 
candidacy it rejected.
When one of the seats on the 15-member CEC re-
mains empty, the decisionmaking process becomes 
complicated, as votes can split down the middle. At 
the moment, it is hard to see a possibility to reach 
political compromise among the main factions in 
the Rada. We can only hope that the OSCE and the 
Council of Europe, to whom most Ukrainian politi-
cians tend to listen, will offer clear recommendations 
regarding the obligation to appoint a new member 
of the CEC before 7 February.
The Electoral Commissions: No money, no voting
The main problem facing electoral commissions at 
all levels has been inadequate and delayed funding. 
This made it difficult for them to carry out their func-
tions completely and in a timely manner. As a result, 
some polling stations opened very late or not at all, 
while some were lacking sufficient ballot papers. On 
the other hand, this did not have a decisive impact 
on the overall voting process and the commissions 
handled the vote count quite well.
The issue of funding could be more critical in the 
second round, given the difficult situation with the 
State Budget.
Electoral Law: Work in progress…
The need to fix the law governing Presidential elec-
tions remained off the radar for politicians almost 
until summer 009. Despite recommendations from 
both the OSCE and the Venice Commission regard-
ing the adoption of an Election Code, Ukraine moved 
into election mode with only mild amendments to 
the Law “On the Election of the President.”
Some provisions of this law raised serious concerns 
among Ukrainian and foreign experts. The mecha-
nisms for verifying voter lists, voting at home and re-
solving disputes over the process and results of the 
election remained contradictory and insufficiently 
effective. Still, Ukraine’s foreign partners did note 
that a democratic Presidential election could be en-
sured if the law were applied “…in good faith and 
in a non-restrictive manner.” The first round con-
firmed this assessment.
Despite their imperfections, the changes to elector-
al legislation demonstrated that politicians were not 
looking to institute mechanisms for vote-rigging. 
Unfortunately, this is not so much a reflection of 
their high political culture as a protective reaction 
to political competition under conditions when no 
candidate was in a position to seriously influence 
the outcome of the elections.
BYT deputies have already submitted a bill to adjust 
certain contradictions in the current election law. 
But the first attempts to debate it in the Verkhov-
na Rada failed, as the bill was not even put on the 
agenda. BYT’s activism on this issue is an attempt 
to confirm widespread expectations of wholesale 
vote-rigging. Given that these predictions proved 
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unfounded during the first round, BYT’s efforts 
look more like an attempt to aggravate the situation 
and to prepare Ukrainian opinion for negative out-
comes. The Party of Regions has strongly opposed 
the proposed amendments, arguing that changing 
the rules in the middle of the electoral process is im-
proper. On the other hand, the PoR thus seems to 
be defending certain opportunities for vote-rigging, 
which brings up bad memories of 004.
Most likely, politicians from both camps will listen to 
the OSCE about refraining from changing electoral 
legislation before this election cycle is completed. 
Still, given the confrontations around this issue, it 
is possible to predict that there will be challenges 
to the last court rulings regarding electoral legisla-
tion. If no final ruling is issued prior to 7 February 
by the High Administrative Court or the Verkhovna 
Rada, electoral commissions will face an ambiguous 
situation. Windows of opportunity for vote-rigging 
will remain, and, along with them, opportunities for 
further challenges of the election’s results.
The Courts: Back in centre stage
Based on the official statements by all those who ran 
in the first round of the Presidential election, no one 
plans to challenge the results in court. Most of the 
complaints reviewed by electoral commissions and 
courts prior and during the vote concerned voter lists. 
Still, the camps of both run-off candidates are prepar-
ing voters for the likelihood that it will be quite differ-
ent from the first round. Both groups are predicting 
vote-rigging and preparing themselves for lawsuits.
Administrative Courts: A new player in the election process
On 1 September 2005, an administrative court system was set up in Ukraine that, among others, was granted full pow-
ers to hear matters related to elections. Administrative courts alone can remove a member of an electoral commission, 
temporarily restrain the media when electoral legislation is being violated, remove or add voters to voter lists, withdraw 
a candidate for the Presidency from registration, and, finally, declare an election void.
This system was gradually built with assistance from the OSCE in terms of training judges, monitoring court practice and 
preparing learning materials. The complete hierarchy of administrative courts was in place prior to 2010. Still, according 
to Ukrainian and foreign analysts, this branch of the judiciary still lacks experience and capacity and has not earned the 
necessary level of public trust, as has, say, the Supreme Court of Ukraine.
Today, 61.7% of Ukrainians do not support the work of the country’s court system. Only the Verkhovna Rada and the 
President have worse ratings, at 66.2% and 67.5% respectively.5 
As in 004, the courts could play a major role in the 
electoral process, given the low level of trust among 
voters regarding the final results, the level of elec-
toral culture, and legal traditions. Still, this time this 
role will be played, not only by the Supreme Court, 
but by the entire newly-created system of adminis-
trative courts.5
Because of its peaceful nature, the first round of this 
Presidential election did not end up testing the en-
tire system. So its real preparedness can only be as-
sumed on the basis of comments from experts and 
representatives of the system itself.
Administrative Courts:  
Chinks in the armor
In addition to inadequate technical and financial re-
sources and a low level of trust among voters, there is 
5 Data from a survey by the Razumkov Center in July 
009.
the problem of how administrators are appointed to 
the courts. For instance, which body is empowered 
to appoint chief justices of administrative courts re-
mains an open question in the current legislation.
This issue proved most urgent in the High Admin-
istrative Court (HAC), when the powers of its chief 
justice lapsed on  December 009. At the moment, 
it is impossible to appoint someone new to the post 
due to this legal gap. The incumbent chief justice 
extended his own powers in a questionable manner 
and has continued to carry out his duties in an “act-
ing” capacity. By law, the “acting” post should have 
been taken up by his first deputy. The effectively 
two-headed HAC is now in a vulnerable position, 
especially as the battle for the top post in the land 
is heating up.
In addition, current legislation fails to resolve a slew 
of other problems—or offers contradictory provi-
sions:
Inside Ukraine, #4, January 2010

Which norms take precedence: those in the Law 
“On the Election of the President” or those in the 
Code of Administrative Justice (CAJ)?
How can the jurisdictions of different types of 
electoral disputes be determined?
May specific rulings on electoral disputes be ap-
pealed and, if so, how should appeals be filed?
Should electoral disputes be decided by a single 
judge or a panel of judges?
In this situation, administrative courts will have to 
take a clear position on these issues solely at their 
own discretion. Yet any position they take could of-
fer grounds for further challenges against their ac-
tions and decisions.
In addition, the courts themselves have been ex-
pressing doubts about the constitutionality of cer-
tain provisions in electoral legislation and the CAJ, 
such as the prohibition on challenging the tabulated 
•
•
•
•
protocols of local and district electoral commissions. 
Such doubts could also turn into appeals to the Con-
stitutional Court from a group of national deputies 
or the incumbent President, if the electoral situation 
attracts enough interest. Involving the Constitution-
al Court could block the entire electoral process for 
an indefinite period.
The Run-off: Running on schedule
The run-off election could see every administra-
tive court turn into a battleground. Ukrainians are 
already being prepared for this eventuality by both 
camps. Meanwhile, everyone is also trying to antici-
pate how long the process of tabulating the votes 
and announcing the final results will take. Is there 
reason to worry? Not really. For one thing, the law 
clearly establishes the order and timeframe for the 
work of electoral  commissions.
Table 2. Timetable for Round 2 of the Presidential Election
Date Event
7 February Second round of voting in the Presidential election.
Voters may turn to local courts, acting as administrative courts, to 
amend errors or be entered into the voters list until 19:00.
No later than 12 February (5 calendar days) District electoral commissions (DECs) finalize vote counting in their 
polling districts, regardless of the number of polling stations in 
which they have declared the vote null and void.
Protocols with vote tabulations in the polling district are transported 
to the CEC immediately after signing.
No later than 18 February (within 10 calendar 
days, but no later than 3 days after receiving last 
protocol from DECs)*
CEC establishes the results of the vote and prepares the necessary 
protocol.
*The CEC may extend this period by 1 (one) day should a district 
commission require time to submit a protocol with “Clarifications.”
No later than 21 February (within 3 days of 
approving CEC protocol)
The CEC publishes a notice of the election results and about any 
decisions it has made, in the Holos Ukrainy and Uriadoviy Kurier 
papers (official VR and Cabinet bulletins).
No later than 2 March (within 30 days of official 
announcement of election results by CEC)
The newly-elected President of Ukraine is inaugurated and given the 
powers of office.
As this timetable for the run-off election shows, both 
DECs and the CEC have clearly established and rel-
atively narrow timeframes for finalizing the results of 
the ballot. Moreover, challenges to the results at any 
level cannot be used to hold up the entire process.
Secondly, the timeframes within which courts are 
obliged to review suits involving the election are 
also clearly defined by special provisions of law and 
extremely tight. Each level in the system of admin-
istrative courts has only two days to review a suit. 
The same amount of time is provided for the review 
of appeals against any rulings. Still, to understand 
the complicated structure and sometimes convolut-
ed formulations, one would need to be a qualified 
Ukrainian lawyer.
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Table . The secret revealed: to which court to turn, when and why?
Object of suit Subject of suit Timeframe for review
Local courts of general jurisdiction acting as administrative courts
Polling station election 
commission (PEC) and its 
members
Clarifying voters lists, other issues Within 2 days of receiving the suit 
but no later than 2 days prior to 
voting day. If a suit comes in within 
2 days of Election Day, it must be 
reviewed immediately.
Media, businesses, institutions, 
organizations and their officers 
and staff, media artists
Violating electoral law 2 days
Media, their owners, officers and 
staff
Violating the rules for media activity during 
the electoral process, including active 
campaigning, especially the requirement to 
retract false materials published regarding 
candidates or the political party or bloc that 
nominated the candidate
2 days
District administrative court with jurisdiction over the relevant EC
District electoral commissions 
(DECs)
Decisions, actions or inaction in the 
preparation and running of the election of 
the President
2 days
PECs and their members Decisions, actions or inaction on the actual 
day of voting, during the counting of ballots 
and establishing the results of the vote
2 days
Central executive bodies (CEBs), 
local government bodies 
(LGBs), companies, institutions, 
organizations, their officers and 
staff
Violating the voting rights or interest in 
participating in the electoral process
2 days
Candidates, their proxies, parties 
or blocs, local party branches, 
their officers and authorized 
official observers
Violating electoral law 2 days
Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeals
CEC Other decisions, actions or inactions 2 days
Candidate for the Presidency, 
party or bloc
Procedure for nominating the candidate, 
election campaigning, other violations of 
civil rights or voting rights of individuals
2 days
Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine
CEC Matters involving the determination of final 
results
2 days
Suits that are submitted prior to 
Election day shall be decided within 
2 days but no later than 2 hours prior 
to voting.
Suits that come in on Election Day 
but after the closing of the polls shall 
be decided within 2 days after their 
receipt.
6 Suits on events having taken place before Election Day can be filed up to the day before election; suits on events tak-
ing place on Election Day must be filed no later than the end of day following election; all others must be filed within 
5 days of the election.
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Thus, provided that all suits regarding the electoral 
process at PECs and DECs are filed in accordance 
with the law, they should be reviewed and final deci-
sions made prior to the announcement of the official 
results by the CEC. Five more days are allowed for 
possible challenges to the CEC and for review by the 
High Administrative Court. However, there are gen-
eral provisions of the CAJ that can be interpreted as 
authorizing administrative courts to extend case re-
view deadlines at their own discretion. 
Dragging out the process of determining and an-
nouncing the final results through lawsuits will 
mean only one thing: the law is not being upheld or 
loopholes and contradictions are being exploited. 
This is the only way the current threats that have 
echoed from both camps could become reality. Un-
fortunately, evidence may not always be the deter-
mining factor in winning a case. There is also a risk 
that the process will go beyond the administrative 
courts, as cases can theoretically be taken to the Su-
preme Court.
Much will also depend on how far individual judg-
es and courts are prepared to go outside the legal 
framework. The reputation of Ukraine’s judiciary 
gives little cause for optimism in this regard.
For Ukraine to win,  
someone must lose
Despite the high marks given to the first round by 
candidates and international observers, there is still 
a tremendous need to pay close attention to all as-
pects of the second round. The biggest risk that this 
process could become both dishonest and undemo-
cratic lies with Ukrainian politicians themselves.
The electoral process has been improved, but efforts 
to do the same with Ukraine’s judiciary have been 
far from successful. This makes it extremely impor-
tant for the attention of international observers to be 
directed not only at the electoral commissions, but 
also at administrative courts at all levels. A positive 
assessment of the run-off election by the OSCE and 
Council of Europe would limit opportunities to chal-
lenge election results in the courts and, therefore, 
the probability of the process being protracted.
Ukrainians have proven that they can elect accord-
ing to law. But are their courts able to judge accord-
ing to the law? Or, as Javier Solana once put it, Can 
they play by the rules and not with the rules?
Now is not the time for Ukraine to think in terms of 
sectoral reform, the economy, or the Constitution. 
The main thing is to survive this election and poten-
tial large-scale courtroom battles to get a new le-
gitimate President before the government collapses 
and loses the trust of both Ukraine’s citizens and its 
western partners.
Any politician who thinks today that he controls the 
courts could well become their victim tomorrow. 
This is why all political players should support at 
least one reform immediately after this election: re-
forming the court system in Ukraine.
